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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-FEDERAL WAGE
AND HOUR REGULATION OF STATE OPERATED FACILITIES WITHIN POWER
GRANTED TO CONGRESS IN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The State of Maryland, appellant in this action, originally brought suit
in a federal district court' in an attempt to enjoin the application of the 1966
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act.2 The 1966 amendments sought
to include the employees of state-operated schools and hospitals within the
framework of the Fair Labor Standards Act, that set down provisions for
minimum wages, maximum hours, and overtime considerations. Prior to these
amendments all such employees were specifically excluded from coverage under
the Act. Maryland's contention was that these amendments were unconstitu-
tional as applied to state employees engaged in public schools and hospitals
because it was beyond the power granted to Congress in the commerce clause'
and that it controverted the provisions of the tenth amendment.4 Judgment was
granted for the Secretary of Labor, by a 2-1 majority, three separate opinions
being written. Maryland then appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
raising the question, whether congressional regulation of minimum wages and max-
imum hours, in the manner of the 1966 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards
Act, controverts the principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision by a 6-2 vote,
Mr. Justice Marshall not sitting and declined to issue an injunction or the
declaratory judgment that was requested by Maryland and the other parties
plaintiff.5 Held, The 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act are con-
stitutional as applied to state operated schools and hospitals, inasmuch as
Congress has the power to regulate those intrastate activities that substantially
effect interstate commerce. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
The Fair Labor Standards Act enacted in 1938 was part of the New Deal
legislation issued in order to curb the effects of the economic depression that
gripped the country at that time. Like other legislation of that era it found
its roots in the commerce clause within the enumerated powers in the Con-
stitution. The commerce power of Congress has had a long and erratic history
due to the vacillations in its interpretation by the Supreme Court. Under Chief
Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden,8 the Court laid the groundwork for a
very broad application of Congress' power under the commerce clause. In fact
1. State of Maryland v. Wirtz, 269 F. Supp. 826 (D. Md. 1967); see Note, 27 Maryland
L. Rev. 416 (1968).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (r), (s), 80 Stat. 830.
3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, [3]. To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.
4. U.S. Const. amend. X. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the
people.
5. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Wyoming.
6. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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the Court said, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, that, "[t]his power,
like all others vested in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in
the constitution."7 [Emphasis added.] Marshall hedged on this broad inter-
pretation of the commerce powers when he warned that the power does not
reach those internal concerns . . . "which are completely within a particular
state, which do not affect other states, and with which it is not necessary to
interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the govern-
ment."18 It has been this judicially interpreted limitation which has precipitated
most of the problems in determining whether a particular activity is or is not
within the scope of the commerce power. Whether an activity is exclusively
within a state's province of regulation, whether it is tapable of concurrent
regulation by both the state and federal government, or whether it falls within
the plenary power of Congress, are the issues that most often confront the
courts when determining whether a specific piece of federal legislation is within
the constitutional powers of Congress.
As the national government becomes more pervasive the court's permissive
attitude in allowing Congressional legislation to stand increases. Thus Congress
was allowed to regulate the sale of lottery tickets,9 obscene material, 10 white
slave traffic," and impure foods or drugs.' 2 Congressional regulation of intra-
state rates of an interstate carrier was upheld in the famous Shreveport Rate
case13 because such rates were said to have "such a close and substantial rela-
tion to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to the
security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate service, ...."14 But
as the commerce power expanded to meet these new challenges the Court began
to retreat. None of the previous results were specifically overruled; rather they
were either ignored or were factually distinguished. In a rather rapid reversal
the Court nullified a congressional attempt to regulate child labor' 5 and then
some years later struck down, in quick succession, congressional acts setting
codes of fair competition in the poultry industry,'0 regulating wages and hours
in the mining industry,' 7 and reducing farm surplus by regulating acreage and
production.' 8
This judicial retreat ended as hastily as it began in 1937 when the decision
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.19 was handed down. There the Court
7. Id. at 196.
8. Id. at 195.
9. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
10. United States v. Popper, 98 F.423 (N.D. Cal. 1899).
11. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
12. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
13. Houston & Texas Ry v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
14. Id. at 351.
15. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
16. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
17. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
18. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
19. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
validated the National Labor Relations Act in its application to a large steel
corporation's discriminatory firings of employees for alleged union activity. The
fact that this discriminatory activity occurred in a local plant did not deter the
Court from viewing the nature of the business in question, i.e., a large interstate
corporation which "affects commerce" under the meaning of the Act.20 Thus
the Court reached the conclusion that was implicit in the reasoning of Gibbons
v. Ogden, that intrastate activities which substantially affect the flow of inter-
state commerce are within the sphere of power given to Congress by the Con-
stitution.
In 1941 the Fair Labor Standards Act was judicially sanctioned in U.S. v.
Darby.21 With NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel already decided the Court
had little trouble in finding sufficient reasons to uphold the Act, the purpose of
which was to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce and to prevent the
production of goods that were purchased under conditions detrimental to health,
safety, welfare, and morals.22 The Court no longer felt the necessity to distin-
guish cases like Hammer v. Dagenhart, instead it specifically overruled it and
asserted that its existence was a "departure from the principles which have
prevailed in the interpretation of the commerce clause both before and since
the decision ... ",23 In order to eliminate the detrimental conditions that existed
in the production of goods for interstate commerce Congress enacted the Fair
Labor Standards Act minimum hourly wage, maximum hours, and overtime
provisions 2 4
Thus Congress and the Supreme Court moved forward to protect those
employees who (themselves) worked on goods that were intended for interstate
commerce. All such employees were not covered by this act however, since there
was a specific provision in the Act that excluded states and their political
subdivisions from the definition of employers, 25 as well as those employees who
were employed in administrative or executive positions 0 The breakthrough
20. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (7), 49 Stat. 450. The term "affecting
commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
21. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
22. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 202 (a) (1964) recites the Congressional
findings and declarations of policy ".... that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods for commerce, of labor condition detrimental to the main-
tenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general
well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of com-
merce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the
several States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) consti-
tutes an unfair method of competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with
the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce."
23. 312 U.S. 100 at 116, 117.
24. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206, 207 (1964).
25. Id. at § 203 (d). "Employer includes any person acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the U.S. or a
State or political subdivision of a State. . . ." (emphasis added).
26. Id. at § 213 (a) (1). The Statute exempts specifically--"any employee employed in a
bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity. .... "
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was apparent. What was once in the complete control of state authority had
now come within the scope of congressional legislation under the sanctioning of
the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the commerce powers. Thus the
question no longer involved the issue of whether Congress could act-but
rather the question was, to what extent could it act?
Thus the question of state 'overeignty with respect to the tenth amendment
became the common issue in almost all the cases dealing with the commerce
clause, including invalidating a state statute that clashed with the Constitution27
and federal legislation that seemed to control local state activity.2 8 The Fair
Labor Standards Act did not invoke the wrath of the state governments until
the 1966 amendments were passed. The Act was amended seven times prior to
1966 but there was never any significant change in the definition of "employ-
ers."' 29 The only significant variation that enlarged the coverage of the 1938
Act occurred in 1961 when the "enterprise" concept was adopted.30 Under this
provision it was no longer necessary for an individual employee to prove that
he was personally engaged in the production of goods for commerce or their
shipment in commerce, rather, in order to be protected by the minimum wage
and maximum hour provisions all he had to show was that the company (enter-
prise) employing him was engaged in such activities. In order that an enterprise
be so considered it had to meet certain annual gross volume of sales tests.31
Thus any employee was now covered even though his specific function was
essentially local in nature as long as the enterprise met the statutory tests.
Eventually such unlikely employees as janitors32 and night watchmen 3 were
brought under the coverage of the statute.
In 1966 the scope of the Act was enlarged further to include public and
non-profit hospitals, schools, and other related institutions. Whereas in the
prior amendments the state-operated institutions were specifically exempt,3 4 the
new amendments specifically ended these exemptions and public institutions
were treated the same as private ones. 35 The twenty-six states who brought
27. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
28. Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342.
29. The amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act on the whole merely changed
the wage and hour provisions of the Act to bring them into accord with the standard rates
and hours of labor generally. The amendments were passed in the following years; 1947,
1949, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1961, 1963.
30. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (r) (1964). "Enterprise means the
related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any
person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes all such activities whether
performed in one or more establishments or by one or more corporate or other organiza-
tions .... 1
31. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (s) (1) as amended (1961) decreased
minimum requirements for gross volume of sales (less excise taxes) from $1,000,000 to
$500,000 and maintained the $250,000 minimum for interestate commerce.
32. Milhaus v. Joseph Greenspon's Son Pipe Co., 237 Mo. App. 112, 164 S.W.2d 180
(1942).
33. A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942). But see Hart v. Gregory,
220 N.C. 180, 16 S.E.2d 837 (1941), for state court contrary ruling.
34. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a) (1).
35. Id. at § 203(d). The amendment now excluded the employees of States and their
333
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this action claimed that this provision was a direct subversion of their individual
sovereignty as guaranteed by the tenth amendment.30 This problem has been
a recurrent one in many cases involving federal legislation of matters which
are seemingly of local concern. The Supreme Court has taken a rather hard
line in upholding most federal legislation since NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel. In forcing a state-owned railroad in California to abide by the federal
regulation of the Safety Appliance Act the Court said "The sovereign power
of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power
to the federal government in the Constitution." 37 However, the Court had
limited itself to those state agencies "created to effect a public purpose"
when they maintained that such agencies are subject to the control and regu-
lation by Congress within the meaning of the commerce clause.38 In a more
recent decision with a factual basis similar to U.S. v. California, the Supreme
Court said that states surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they
granted the power to Congress to regulate commerce.
30
The appellants based their argument on four contentions:
First, that the expansion of coverage through the "Enterprise Concept"
was beyond the powers of Congress under the commerce clause, second, that
Congressional coverage of state operated hospitals and schools was also beyond
the Congress' powers, third, that the remedial provisions in the Act, if applied
to the states would conflict with the eleventh amendment, and fourth, that if
the constitutional arguments were rejected, the Court should declare that schools
and hospitals as enterprises do not have statutorily required relationship to
interstate commerce.
In reaching their conclusion the Court had to overcome two major road-
blocks-first, that the regulation of state operated hospitals and public schools
is beyond the power of Congress and impinges on the state's sovereignty and
second, that the application of the regulation to "enterprises" is beyond the
reach of the commerce power.
The first problem was easy for the court to resolve since precedent existed
upholding federal legislation that was seemingly contrary to a state's interest.40
In fact, the problem of infringing upon a state's sovereignty in the area of
regulating interstate commerce has become almost moot since the decision in
U.S. v. Darby when Justice Stone dismissed the whole problem by simply stating
that the tenth amendment is nothing but a "truism, 4 1 meaning, that which is
political subdivisions except for those employed in "(1) a hospital, institution, or school;
(2) operation of a railway or corporation, or labor organization.. .
36. Maryland v. Wirtz, 269 F. Supp. 826 (D. Md. 1967).
37. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 at 184 (1936).
38. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) ; Sanitary District v. United States,
266 U.S. 405 (1925); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) ; Board of Trustees
v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933).
39. Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
40. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936); United States v. Ohio, 385 U.S.
9 (1966); rev'g 354 F.2d 549 (1965).
41. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 at 124.
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not regulated by the federal government is reserved to the state but that which
is regulated by the federal government within their constitutional powers can-
not possibly, by definition, infringe on a state's sovereignty since such sover-
eignty only arises in the absence of federal legislation. Thus, all the Court had
to show was that this legislation by Congress was within its constitutional
powers. In order to do this the Court had to pass on the Enterprise concept
as well. The "Rational Basis" test was the Court's mode for accomplishing this
result,42 i.e., did Congress have a "rational basis" for passing this legislation
in order to maintain its control over interstate commerce?
The Court found two rational bases for the need for such legislation. The
first was that wages and hours affect a company's "competitive" position and
their price structures thus affecting commerce. 43 The logical inference from this
theory is that an unfair competitive advantage will exist unless all the employees
of the organization are subject to the legislation rather than only those employ-
ees engaged in the interstate commerce or in the production of goods for inter-
state commerce. Thus the Court felt there was a rational basis for making all
the employees of the enterprise subject to the Act. The fact that these activities
may be local in nature is of insufficient moment since the commerce power is
not confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce only among the
states, but rather it extends to those intrastate activities which affect inter-
state commerce and to those acts which in a substantial way interfere with or
obstruct the exercise of the granted powers.4 As long as the activities in question
exert a "substantial economic effect" on interstate commerce it is immaterial
whether such activities exert this effect directly or indirectly.45
The second rational basis the court found was that the legislation was
needed for the protection against possible "labor strife" which also could have
great detrimental affect upon interstate commerce. This was the basis for the
passage of the NLRA and it would be completely inconsistent for the Court to
assert at this time that Congress does not have a rational basis for prescribing
minimum labor standards for schools and hospitals as well as for other import-
ing enterprises. The volume of interstate importation of goods was significant, 6
thus coming within the bounds of the minimum amounts necessary for com-
pliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act.47 Thus since a private person would
be bound by such legislation, it is untenable to exclude a state acting in the
capacity of a private person simply because it is a state.4 8
42. Maryland v. Wirtz, 393 U.S. 183 (1968).
43. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel, 371 U.S. 224 at 226 (1962).
44. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. 110 at 119 (1942).
45. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 at 123 (1942).
46. For instance Maryland stipulated that it spent $8,000,000 for school supplies in the
year 1965, 87% of which was through interstate commerce. These figures were said to be
indicative of the other states as well. 269 F. Supp. at 833.
47. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (a)(1) as amended (1961).
48. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936); Board of Trustees v. United
States, 289 U.S. 48 (1932); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1945).
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Besides these two major contentions made by the petitioner that the court
,dealt with, two other arguments were presented that were not passed on by
,either the district court or the Supreme Court. The only response elicited by
the Court in this context was that they would be met when future appropriate
,cases come fourth. The first contention was that the remedial provisions of the
Act49 violate the State's sovereign immunity granted by the eleventh amend-
ment and the other was that the hospitals and schools do not have the statu-
torily required relations to interstate commerce to come under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Here the court said that "whether particular institutions have
employees handling goods in commerce may be considered as the occasion
arises." 50 Thus the Court eliminated from discussion those areas that were not
directly in dispute and countered those contentions of the states that fell
squarely on the issue at bar.
The holding of the Court, accepting the 1966 amendments and their appli-
cation to the states was inevitable, but nevertheless, surprising, considering the
ease with which the Court reached its result. The Court rejected outright the
state's contention that the operation of state public schools and hospitals is
a governmental function and thus should be free from federal wage and hour
legislation. By using the rational basis test the Court did not have to confront
the issue of a possible federal takeover of a state's sovereign functions but
such a concern was manifested in the dissent of Justices Douglas and Stewart.
The Court looked at the effect of such enterprises upon interstate commerce and
their significant use of such commerce and refused to shut its eyes to this effect
simply because such effect was state operated rather than resulting from the
private sector. From a realistic appraisal of the situation there can be little doubt
that these enterprises play a significant part in the movement of interstate
commerce and thus their incorporation into the scope of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act was necessary. But the problem lies in the possible future emascula-
tion of state sovereignty.
Legislation like the Fair Labor Standards Act was passed originally for
the protection of employees within the private sector. If such legislation can be
expanded to curtail a state's operation of its governmental functions then we
may lose the fundamental separation of powers between state government and
federal government. The rationale for expansion in the present situation is that
states are acting in the capacity of private individuals and thus should be sub-
ject to the same legislation as private citizens. The problem with this approach
is that there is no clear boundary line that delimits a state's functions from a
private citizen's functions. Some such limitation will be needed if the funda-
mental dual nature of our government is to survive. Justice Douglas' dissent
intimates the possible outcome of such overlapping of sovereignties. While such
49. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (a) (b) (c), § 217.
50. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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a threat is probably premature at this time, there is a necessity for a more
solid framework if the possible emasculation of the state's sovereignty is to be
forever eliminated.
THEODORE S. KANTOR
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
-CONvICTION OF A CHRONIC ALCOHOLIC FOR PUBLIC INTOXICATION NOT VIO-
LATIVE OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROSCRIPTION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
On December 19, 1966, a police officer observed appellant Leroy Powell in
an intoxicated condition in the 2000 block of Hamilton Street in Austin, Texas,
and placed him under arrest for public intoxication. Appearing in the Corpora-
tion Court of Austin, appellant was found guilty of violating Article 477 of the
Texas Penal Code1 and fined $20.00. He appealed the conviction to the County
Court of Law No. 1 of Travis County, Texas, where a trial de novo was con-
ducted. At the time of his trial, appellant was 66 years old. His life history
indicated that he had a severe drinking problem.2 The primary testimony at
1. Vernon's Penal Code, Art. 477, Vol. 1, 497 (1925).
2. "Appellant is 66 years old. He is married and has one child, a daughter. Although
appellant sometimes spends nights at home, he usually sleeps in public places, such as the
sidewalk, when he gets drunk. He does not support his wife or child.
Appellant worked as a laborer for the City of Austin until he injured his back in 1955.
Since then he has been unable to do heavy work. Beginning in 1956 or 1957 he has worked
in a tavern shining shoes. He currently earns about $12 per week, which he uses to buy wine.
Appellant began drinking alcoholic beverages in about 1925. His Austin Police
Department arrest record shows that he was first arrested there for public drunkenness in
1949, and that he has been arrested for drunkenness at least once every year since 1952. He
has been arrested for drunkenness on some 25 other occasions outside Travis County, pri-
marily in Bastrop County.
The fine customarily imposed for drunkenness in Travis County is $20 and in Bastrop
County $25. Appellant is usually unable to pay the fine when he is arrested, and therefore
is required to work it off in jail. The record does not disclose how many months he has spent
in jail in lieu of paying fines.
Appellant's arrest record is only illustrative of his drinking problem. He testified that
he has been 'pretty lucky' in not being arrested when he is drunk. The record shows that
he drinks wine every day and becomes so drunk he passes out about once a week. The only
limitation on his consumption of alcohol is his megar income. Appellant took four or five
drinks the night before his trial, and another drink at 8 a.m. the morning before his trial.
The money for his morning drink was given to him, and he would have had more to drink
at the time if he had been given more money.
As a result of constant drinking and intoxication, appellant has been unable to find
employment anywhere but at the tavern. He applied for jobs both in the Austin Independent
School District and at the State Office Building but was turned down because of his drinking
problem.
Appellant's drinking, however, has not threatened harm to any member of the public.
Officer Mauldin testified that he was not engaged in loud or boisterous conduct, was not
fighting, and did not resist arrest. Apart from a single arrest for disorderly conduct in 1951,
all of appellant's arrests have been for public drunkenness.
Alcoholism has impaired appellant's perception and memory. He testified that he does
not always know where he is after he starts drinking. Indeed he was unable to recall anything
about his arrest for drunkenness which gave rise to the present conviction. Whole episodes
